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How the Indians Won America read online by Peter Cozzens (Page 10)

The next evening, despite the protests of the officers, Carrington, wishing that the Indians would not consider him a coward, led the soldiers to collect the bodies, which had overlooked the rescue party. But there was no one to demonstrate courage – the Indians were no longer there. Satisfied with a glorious victory in the battle, which the Indians called “Hundred in hand” [The name of the battle comes from the prophecy of a clairvoyant Lakota medicine man. Before the battle, he galloped four times over the ledge, from which a view of the future battlefield opened, and each time he recruited a handful of imaginary enemies. Finally, the medicine man announced to Red Cloud that he already had a hundred blue uniforms in his hands and he could hardly hold them. — Approx. trans.], the warriors returned to spend the winter in the valley of the Tong River [Vankirk to his father, January 30, 1867; 39th Cong., Fort Phil Kearney sic] Massacre, 10; Murphy, “Forgotten Battalion”, 4:71–72; Guthrie, “Detail of the Fetterman Massacre”, 8; Vestal, Warpath, 68. The Indians lost twenty warriors killed, the number of wounded is not established.].

News of the “massacre” shocked the country and disgraced the army. Cook removed Carrington, Grant removed Cook, and Sherman, beside himself with rage, declared to Grant: “We must give the Sioux their due and, if necessary, destroy them all – men, women and children.” He ordered the new commander of the Platt Department, Colonel Christopher Ogar, to prepare a summer campaign.

But Sherman’s plans ran counter to a grand peace talks initiative inspired by the results of the Congressional investigation after the Sand Creek Massacre. In January 1867, the commission, chaired by Senator James Doolittle, published its report. After almost two years of work, the commission concluded that disease, alcohol, tribal strife and “outrageous whites who do not recognize the law”, as well as “stubborn and inevitable colonization of Indian hunting grounds by whites” threaten the existence of the tribes of the Great Plains. Having spoken out in the most unflattering terms to dishonest agents, whiskey dealers who profit from friendly Indians, and windbag negotiators who only confused or angered the already hostile Indians, the commission recommended that the tribes be moved away from the roads and settlements of whites – in reservations where warriors will be raised to be economically independent Christian farmers. This is not a new idea, which formed the basis of the Dolittle Commission project, which will determine federal policy towards the Indians for the next fifteen years.

The Western press unanimously criticized the government’s “perpetual slobbering and spinelessness,” but Congress and the Department of the Interior backed Dolittle. In February 1867, President Andrew Johnson signed an executive order establishing a commission to decide how to end the war with Red Cloud without resorting to arms. Sherman reluctantly shelved his plans.

Red Cloud was under pressure no less than General Sherman. The allied tribes could not agree on whom to attack in the summer, and when Red Cloud failed to bring them to an agreement, the Indians split into two camps. In July 1867, between 500 and 800 Cheyennes marched on Fort Smith, and Red Cloud led a thousand-strong Lakota force into a new battle against Fort Phil Kearney.

The Indians did not suspect that this time they were dealing with a much stronger enemy. Colonel Ogar brought in reinforcements for Forts Phil Kearney and Smith, armed with new breech-loading rifles that increased the range and morale of the soldiers. However, with the replenishment, a new commander also arrived, due to which, at least in Fort Smith, the morale died down again. Expressing the general opinion, the garrison doctor described Lieutenant Colonel Luther Bradley as “a swaggering old bachelor tyrant who does not like anyone here and knows nothing about fighting Indians.” Fort Phil Kearney was more fortunate: John Smith, who had more than one major battle of the Civil War behind him and was respected in the army, was appointed there. Finally, Fort Phil Kearney was commanded by a man with combat experience [39th Cong., Indian Hostilities, 27; McDermott, Red Cloud’s War, 2:317, 403; Larson, Red Cloud, 111].

The Cheyenne were the first to shed enemy blood that summer. Since the garrison had tripled in size (which the Indian scouts found out quickly), an attack on Fort Smith was impossible. However, 4 km away was a vulnerable outpost located in a hay meadow, where civilians built a small log corral to take cover in case of attack. On the evening of July 31, a friendly Crow warned the mowers that the next morning “the whole face of the earth will hide here under a crowd of Indians.” The mowers ignored the warning and went to work in the morning as usual. While they were mowing and stacking hay, a detachment of 22 fighters whiled away the time playing cards and throwing horseshoes. At noon, a rifle shot was heard from the observation post – an alarm signal. As hundreds of Cheyenne horsemen poured into the meadow, the soldiers and mowers retreated into the corral. Everyone hid except for the lieutenant, who scolded the men for their cowardice until he collapsed, shot through the temple, struck by a bullet from an Indian sniper. The command was taken by the driver – a former officer of the army of the northerners Al Colvin. He gave exhaustive orders, without wasting unnecessary words: “Do not stick out, do not stick out in plain sight. Take care of the cartridges, keep the last one for yourself. The firepower of the new breech-loading rifled muskets on the soldiers and repeating shotguns on the civilians stunned the Cheyenne. After two unsuccessful attacks, the Indians set fire to the hay and began to approach the enemy, hiding behind a curtain of fire and smoke thinning about twenty paces from the corral. The defenders, aiming blindly through the smoke, still managed to take down enough opponents for this attack to bog down. The Indians made their last attempt to take the corral by dismounting and coming from the south. Anticipating this maneuver, Colvin concentrated his forces on the south side and ordered the men to fire shotguns at the enemy at close range. Colvin himself shot the Lakota leader – almost at the very corral, so close that the Indians could not get close and carry away his corpse and mourned their leader on a cliff across the river.

The battle raged for four hours. When the shooting began, Colonel Bradley slammed the gates of the fort and ordered no one to even stick their nose out. But after a while he changed his mind and sent reinforcements. Arriving to help brought two guns. The Indians were afraid of these “witch guns” and left the battlefield after the first shots.

At least twenty Indians died in the Battle of the Hayfield. The Whites lost three killed and three wounded. In order for the Indians to think carefully about whether to attack again, Bradley ordered that the head of the Lakota leader shot by Colvin be put up on a pole in front of the gates of Fort Smith [McDermott, Red Cloud’s War, 2:381–82, 391–401; Greene, “Hayfield Fight”, 40; David, Finn Burnett, 166–67; J. B. Burroughs to George Templeton, August 3, 1867, George M. Templeton Papers.].

And 150 km south along the Bozeman Road, Red Cloud moved to Fort Phil Kearney as the nominal leader of a motley assembly of warriors, heated by the Summer Sun Dance ceremony. Their target was the outpost of the fort, an old logging site. A corral made up of fourteen boxes of army wagons served as shelter and gathering place for the lumberjacks and the infantry company guarding them – a rather dubious protection. On a hot summer morning on August 2, a band of Indians, repeating the same trick that had worked with Fetterman, scattered from the logging camp. However, the soldiers did not let themselves be lured into the open. Four civilians, two officers and 26 privates lay down in boxes that allowed them to shoot through the “loops” made in the walls, hid behind barrels and bales of clothes – for everything that could at least somehow protect against a bullet. Captain James Powell gave a single order: “Guys, they’re coming! In places, and shoot to kill! No other words were required, everyone understood that the situation was desperate. Seasoned soldiers pulled out their shoelaces to tie the trigger of their guns to their feet and have time to blow their brains out if the Indians broke through the defenses.

Red Cloud, along with the warlords and chief elders, watched the battle from a hilltop one and a half kilometers from the battlefield. Things went wrong for the Indians at first. The grazing army mules were too tempting prey, and two hundred warriors jumped out on the plateau ahead of time to capture them. When the main body—probably under the command of Crazy Horse—rushed to the corral from the southwest, the Indians met with a rebuff much stronger than expected. “As soon as we started to shoot, the darkness, the darkness of the Indians jumped up to us for a hundred and fifty steps and froze, waiting for us to pull out the ramrods and start reloading the guns. They thought we were still using the old muzzleloaders,” the private recalled. – And we, without losing precious time, opened the bolts of new guns, threw out the spent cartridge case and laid a new cartridge. The Indians were puzzled by this and retreated out of range.” Subsequently, the Red Cloud will call the breechloaders “guns that chatter.”

The reluctance of the Indians to attack under heavy fire from new guns matched their desire to cut losses, but it cost them victory in this battle. All the defenders, whose testimonies have come down to us, unanimously admitted that they would not have lasted ten minutes if the Indians had continued the attack. But they only galloped around the corral at a safe distance and, shouting threats, fired arrows from under the horse’s neck, hanging on the side farthest from the enemy. The sight was, though frightening, but harmless, since they aimed mostly at random. But the soldiers did not shoot much more accurately. Hitting a fast-moving Indian was not an easy task, and because of the smoke, the line of sight ended a few steps from the corral, and it was risky to lean out of the box to shoot. The fire of the Indian snipers was deadly, one of them shot the lieutenant, who rose during the attack.